Central District Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney's Association

charsetndows-1252
You should really read CCP 425.16(c)(1), which the mandatory recovery of attorneys fees and costs for a prevailing defendant. I don't believe that can be read to be anything but compensatory. And note the next sentence which awards attorneys fees to a prevailing plaintiff only if the motion to strike was frivolous or intended for delay (i.e. punitive award). I'm not sure whether the cited Government Code sections in 425.16(c)(2) add anything to that "argument" but I'm sure you will check. The Findley case depends on specific "penalty" language in the amended State Bar statute, which has no similarity to the anti-SLAPP statute.
So, I think PC has a lot more than "an argument". What he/she apparently doesn't have is precedent.
Jason
Jason Wallach
jwallach@gladstonemichel.com
On Jun 15, 2014, at 12:25 PM, 'Mark J. Markus' bklawr@yahoo.com [cdcbaa] wrote:
>
> Never mind, Jon. Michael's case cites contained the state bar cases you referred to.
>
> It doesn't look good for my potential client...although I think an argument can be made.
>
> *************************
> Mark J. Markus
> Law Office of Mark J. Markus
> Mailing Address Only:
> 11684 Ventura Blvd. PMB #403
> Studio City, CA 91604-2652
> (818)509-1173 (818)509-1460 (fax)
> web: http://www.bklaw.com/
> Certified Bankruptcy Law Specialist--The State Bar of California Board of Legal Specialization
> This Firm is a Qualified Federal Debt Relief Agency
> ________________________________________________
> NOTICE: This Electronic Message contains information from the law office of Mark J. Markus that may be privileged. The information is intended for the use of the addressee only. If you are not the addressee, note that any disclosure, copy, distribution or use of the contents of this message is prohibited.
> IRS CIRCULAR 230 NOTICE: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication (or in any attachment) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed in this communication.
> On 6/15/2014 8:46 AM, jhayes@hayesbklaw.com [cdcbaa] wrote:
>> There have two recent, meanie past couple years, I remember where it was fees owing the state bar arising from a discipline proceeding. Even it seems to me to be clear that the fine is reimbursement, and therefore discharged, the bap said it's just how they computed the fine, not really reimbursement. It's intended as punishment, not reimbursement. Nonsense if you ask me. Is your case payable to the gov?
>
>
>
charsetndows-1252
You should really read CCP 425.16(c)(1), which the mandatory recovery of attorneys fees and costs for a prevailing defendant. I don't believe that can be read to be anything but compensatory. And note the next sentence which awards attorneys fees to a prevailing plaintiff only if the motion to strike was frivolous or intended for delay (i.e. punitive award). I'm not sure whether the cited Government Code sections in 425.16(c)(2) add anything to that "argument" but I'm sure you will check. The Findley case depends on specific "penalty" language in the amended State Bar statute, which has no similarity to the anti-SLAPP statute. So, I think PC has a lot more than "an argument". What he/she apparently doesn't have is precedent.Jason
Jason Wallach
The post was migrated from Yahoo.